A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. The legitimate first "moves" are specified by the principle of justice in acquisition. Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transfer preserve justice. As correct rules of inference are truth-preserving, and any conclusion deduced via repeated application of such rules from only true premises is itself true, so the means of transition from one situation to another specified by the principle of justice in transfer are justice-preserving, and any situation actually arising from repeated transitions in accordance with the principle from a just situation is itself just.
When I read that, I kind of just pulled up short -- I do not think this line of analysis is fruitful, but Nozick's assertion just ran headlong into my understanding of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, particularly as described in "Godel, Escher, Bach" by Douglas Hofstadter. If it is wrong, I think the reason has more to do with non-linear dynamics than incompleteness. But I just don't have the philosophical chops to get any further on my own.
I do feel it is an unproven assertion. Just saying that justice operations are exactly analogous to truth operations seems to skip over an essential part of the argument. Maybe the proof lies elsewhere? Maybe it is self-evidently true for some reason I do not see?
Dear reader, if you can help me resolve my lack of understanding, I'd be grateful.
1 comment:
I haven’t read “Anarchy...”, but Nozick’s claim here seems straightforward (though not obviously true).
Start with truth and deductive logic. Sound deductive arguments are, by definition, truth preserving. This means that if you use legitimate logical steps (such as modus ponens: if P implies Q, and P is true, then Q must be true as well), then any time you start with true premises you’re guaranteed to get a true conclusion out.
Nozick is saying that justice works in a similar way. There are certain rules of transfer that guarantee that whenever you start with a just distribution you also end up with a just distribution. These rules obey what he is calling the “principle of justice in transfer.”
I think you’re giving his account more credit than it deserves when you ask about the relevance of nonlinear dynamics or the completeness theorem.
Nozick’s position is simplistic, and the first questions we should ask will be simple too.
Are there non-trivial rules of transfer that preserve justice? (Note that if the rules rely on something like “Make sure the resulting distribution is just,” then they’re trivial, and likely useless.)
What are these rules? If it seems that some candidate rule lands us in unjust distributions, should we conclude that despite appearances the distribution actually is just? Or should we conclude that we got the rules wrong?
Or maybe we should conclude that there are no justice-preserving rules at all, and we will always need to look at the distributions themselves to decide whether they’re just, regardless of how we got there.
You're certainly right that he offers nothing to support his assertion in this passage.
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